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DIFFERENCES THAT MATTER:  HIRING MODES AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
(DIS)SIMILARITY IN EXECUTIVE SELECTION 
 
Abstract 
Scholars, practitioners, and policymakers have long acknowledged the importance of 
understanding the antecedents of top management team (TMT) composition. Yet, research on how 
and why firms select executives who are demographically dissimilar to incumbent TMT members 
remains limited. We take a step toward answering these questions by employing a sample of 575 
individual-level executive appointments at 170 large European firms between 2005 and 2009. 
Drawing on the person-group fit perspective, we argue that firms are more likely to appoint socio-
demographically dissimilar executives through internal promotion – while external hires are more 
likely to socio-demographically resemble incumbent top managers. Our results support the 
hypothesized relationship. They also show that this relationship is influenced by the level of 
administrative complexity and environmental uncertainty facing the firm. Overall, our theory and 
results enhance our understanding of ‘why top management teams are composed the way they are’, 
by highlighting the impact of internal and external hiring modes in the selection of demographically 
(dis)similar executives. 
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Introduction 
Strategic leadership research has long acknowledged the importance of understanding the 
antecedents and consequences of top management team (TMT) composition (Chaganti & 
Sambharya, 1987; Guthrie & Datta, 1997; Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004; Hambrick, 
2007; Greve, Biemann, & Ruigrok, 2015; Oehmichen, Heyden, Georgakakis & Volberda, 2017). 
Despite substantial progress in this area, the selection of individual executives to the most dominant 
decision-making body of the firm (i.e., the TMT) is a topic that remains relatively unexplored 
(Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella, 2009). Understanding the hiring modes (i.e., internal 
promotion versus external hiring) through which firms appoint dissimilar top managers is 
important, as it will eventually allow us not only to enhance our understanding of “why do top 
management teams look the way they do” (Hambrick, 2007: 338), but also to appreciate the role 
of executive selection practices in affecting the attributes of newly appointed TMT members. 
In this study, we address this important topic by examining the relationship between the 
hiring origin and the demographic dissimilarity of incoming executives. Extant studies have 
described the countervailing forces that determine TMT composition (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; 
Boone, van Olffen, van Witteloostuijn, & de Brabander, 2004). On the one hand, theories of 
homosocial reproduction suggest that micro-level psychological factors – such as similarity 
attraction – lead to a preference for individuals who demographically resemble incumbent team 
members (Boone et al., 2004; Kanter, 1977; Schaubroeck, Ganster, & Jones, 1998). On the other 
hand, studies adopting a resource-based perspective suggest that meso- (organizational) and macro- 
(environmental) level forces encourage firms to increase TMT diversity by selecting executives 
who are dissimilar to the existing group (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Boone et al., 2004; Carpenter, 
2002; Nielsen, 2009; Pennings & Wezel, 2010).  
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Drawing on the Person-Group (P-G) fit literature (Seong, Kristof-Brown, Park, Hong & 
Shin, 2015; Werbel & Johnson, 2001) we add to this discussion by suggesting that different hiring 
modes (i.e. internal versus external hiring) affect how firms respond to similarity attraction 
inclinations. According to the P-G fit perspective, supplementary fit refers to the similarity in 
values among individuals and groups (Seong et al., 2015). Prior studies have suggested that socio-
demographic characteristics reflect the underlying values, beliefs and perceptual filters of 
individuals (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013). If there is no prior information 
gained through an individual’s tenure in the team or the organization, the P-G fit of a socio-
demographically dissimilar candidate will be perceived as lower (Werbel & Johnson, 2001). On 
this basis, we argue that as firms have information about the supplementary-fit of an internal 
candidate to the rest of the group through the former’s prior tenure inside the organization, they are 
likely to pay less attention to the candidate’s externally-observable demographic traits in evaluating 
his or her fit with the rest of the group – and thus exhibit a weaker tendency toward homogeneity 
reproduction in demographic attributes. On the other hand, when appointing an outsider, decision 
making teams will often lack detailed information to judge the supplementary-fit of the candidate 
to the group and the organization – owing to the external candidate’s lack of firm-specific 
experience and prior socialization inside the organization. When evaluating an external candidate’s 
potential to integrate in the group, decision makers will therefore rely more on externally-
observable demographic similarity between the candidate and the existing team. We argue that this 
will strengthen similarity attraction tendencies, and will result in a preference for hiring external 
candidates who socio-demographically resemble incumbent members. 
Our study offers several contributions. First, it builds a bridge between the P-G fit literature 
(Kristof, 1996; Seong et al., 2015) and research on similarity attraction and social identity (Kanter, 
1977; Schneider, 1987) to explain how and why firms select executives who demographically differ 
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from incumbent TMT members. It shows that the core assumptions of social identity and similarity 
attraction theories about homogeneity reproduction in teams and working groups have stronger 
explanatory power for external hiring rather than for internal promotion decisions. In this regard, 
our work contributes to our understanding of how different modes of hiring executives can 
systematically result in the appointment of candidates with different characteristics. 
Second, our study highlights the multilevel factors that affect executive selection decisions 
(Klimoski & Koles, 2001). Past research has associated organizational complexity and 
environmental uncertainty with information-processing demands that drive firms to hire executives 
who are dissimilar to the rest of the group (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Boone et al., 2004). Our 
work contributes to a more nuanced view on the effects of these contingency factors. It 
demonstrates that administrative complexity reduces the negative relationship between external 
hiring and demographic dissimilarity of new TMT members, while environmental uncertainty 
strengthens this relationship. In this regard, our theory and results challenge traditional wisdom on 
how these contingency factors impact TMT configuration. Overall, our work stresses that the 
demographic profiles of newly appointed TMT members are subject to the boundary conditions 
surrounding the organization at the time of executive selection.  
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The selection of executives is typically a joint effort of the CEO and other governance bodies, 
including the incumbent TMT (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005; Finkelstein et al., 2009). Given the 
distinct role of top managers in making decisions that are highly critical for organizations, scholars 
have acknowledged that actual executive selection practices vary widely from one case to the next 
– ranging from relatively loose informal approaches to rigid formalized processes (Carpenter et al., 
2004; Klimoski & Koles, 2001). Scholars have also noted that executive selection practices differ 
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widely compared to selection of team members at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy 
(Hollenbeck, 2009). Executive selection, succession, and replacement are often affected by internal 
dynamics and external contingencies that affect the interaction of TMT members and the 
functioning of TMTs (Georgakakis & Ruigrok, 2017; Shen & Cannella, 2002). These 
particularities and idiosyncrasies of executive selection are important to bear in mind as we outline 
the drivers toward homosocial reproduction and heterogeneity in TMTs. 
Drivers Toward Homosocial Reproduction  
Social identity and similarity attraction theories provide the conceptual foundations of 
homogeneity reproduction in working groups (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001; Kanter, 
1977; Tajfel, 1974; William & O’Reilly, 1998). This stream suggests that individuals are inherently 
inclined to like, trust and interact with similar others, while at the same time dislike, mistrust and 
avoid interaction with outgroup members (Schneider, 1987). Due to their inherent similarity 
attraction inclinations at the time of executive selection, management groups are likely to reproduce 
their characteristics by selecting new TMT members who demographically resemble the incumbent 
team (Kanter, 1977). There are two main mechanisms which drive this phenomenon. 
First, due to similarity attraction inclinations, demographic resemblance increases the 
likelihood of positive evaluations at the time of executive selection (Kanter, 1977). According to 
Latham, Wexley and Pursell, “the more closely an assessee resembles the rater in attitudes and 
background, the stronger the tendency of the rater to judge that individual higher” (1975: 551). The 
inherent inclination to evaluate similar others more favorably (Kanter, 1977) prompts dominant 
groups to appoint new team members who are demographically similar to themselves, and 
reproduce homogeneity over time (Schneider, 1987). 
Second, candidates who are demographically dissimilar to incumbents generate more 
uncertainty at the time of selection with regard to their post-appointment supplementary-fit 
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(Edwards, 2008) and integration in the existing team (Jackson, Stone, & Alvarez, 1993; Kanter, 
1977). Due to social identity inclinations that affect interpersonal interaction in the post 
appointment stage, decision-makers may perceive a demographically dissimilar candidate as more 
difficult to integrate in the group. This uncertainty concerning the post-appointment integration of 
dissimilar candidates encourages incumbents to select new team members who resemble 
themselves in socio-demographic characteristics. Indeed, Kanter (1977) pointed out that “one way 
to ensure acceptance and ease of communication was to limit managerial jobs to those who were 
socially homogeneous” (1977: 58). 
 
Drivers of Hiring Socio-demographically Dissimilar Executives  
Whereas social identity and similarity attraction arguments predict the homogenization of 
dominant groups (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998), resource-based perspectives underscore the meso- 
and macro-level forces that encourage the selection of dissimilar others (Keck & Tushman, 1993). 
To effectively navigate competitive environments and engage with diverse stakeholders, firms 
must have the ability to solve complex problems and respond to heterogeneous external demands 
by seeking advice from inside or outside the organization (Heyden, van Doorn, Reimer, van den 
Bosch & Volberda, 2013). Indeed, existing research suggests that meso- and macro-level factors 
stimulate the pursuit of TMT diversity (Keck & Tushman, 1993), and may also moderate the 
propensity to select dissimilar executives under certain conditions (Boone et al., 2004; Nielsen, 
2009). 
From a resource-based perspective, diversity in demographic characteristics provides a 
team with a range of individual backgrounds and mindsets that are necessary to respond to the 
variety of internal and external stakeholder demands surrounding the organization (Jackson, Joshi 
& Erhardt, 2003; Phillips, Liljenquist & Neale, 2009; Richard, 2000). Top managers with diverse 
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demographic attributes are likely to act as effective vehicles of decision making and problem-
solving (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Milliken & Martins, 1996). Hiring executive candidates who are 
dissimilar to incumbent top managers can thus serve as a strategic response to contextual demands 
(Nielsen, 2009). 
At the macro-level, executive leaders serve an important role in linking the firm with its 
environment (Hambrick, Finkelstein & Mooney, 2005) by acting as boundary spanners who 
provide a variety of resources to the firm (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001). Indeed, past research 
has underscored the need for executive leaders with diverse characteristics and cognitive schemas 
at firms that operate in challenging environments (Finkelstein et al., 2009). The heterogeneous 
demands facing TMTs (Hambrick et al., 2005) will thus prompt the appointment of dissimilar 
executives, thereby enhancing the overall cognitive capacity of the TMT as well as its ability to 
assess a wider variety of options in strategic decision making. 
 
The Role of Hiring Modes: A Person-Group Fit Perspective 
The P-G fit perspective has emerged as a subcategory within the broader Person-Environment (P-
E) fit literature (Edwards, 2008; Werbel & Johnson, 2001). It implies that – when making selection 
decisions – recruiters attempt to evaluate a candidate’s complementary- and supplementary-fit with 
the rest of the existing group. While the complementary-fit most often refers to the 
complementarities of a candidate in terms of job-related attributes, the supplementary-fit refers to 
the compatibility (or similarity-fit) between a person and the incumbent group (Kristof-Brown & 
Guay, 2011). In this regard, scholars have argued that if firms manage to enhance the 
supplementary-fit between new hires and the rest of the team, they are likely to realize higher job 
satisfaction and team cohesion, thus producing desirable group-level outcomes (Werbel & Johnson, 
2001). 
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To judge the supplementary-fit of a candidate with the rest of the group, decision makers 
can consider two types of characteristics: (a) ‘externally observable characteristics’, including 
socio-demographic traits such as age, gender, and nationality, and (b) ‘unobservable attributes’ 
such as information about candidates’ socialization and integration in prior positions (Bills, 1999; 
Werbel & Johnson, 2001). While the latter type provides objective information about an 
individual’s ability to integrate and fit with the processes, purpose, and functioning of the group, 
the former provides information about the socio-demographic attributes of the individual (Bills, 
1999). For internal candidates, firms are likely to judge the person’s supplementary-fit by focusing 
on the privileged information they have about the candidate’s past tenure and socialization inside 
the organization, rather than by paying attention to the individual’s socio-demographic 
characteristics (Edwards, 2008). This is because information gained through a candidate’s prior 
tenure inside the firm is a relatively more accurate predictor of the candidate’s potential 
supplementary-fit and propensity to integrate with the rest of the group and the organization 
(Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman & Johnson, 2005). Hence, the externally observable socio-
demographic characteristics of internal candidates will be perceived as being of limited importance 
in the selection process. 
On the other hand, for external candidates, socio-demographic resemblance with the 
incumbent TMT is likely to play a stronger role at the time of selection. As firms and decision-
making teams often lack information about an outsider’s socialization and assimilation potential, 
they are more likely to pay attention to observable attributes in judging his or her supplementary-
fit to the incumbent group. For external candidates, observable socio-demographic similarity may 
be (consciously or unconsciously) perceived as a substitute for the relative lack of privileged 
information about the candidates’ integration potential (Jackson, et al., 1993; Zajac & Westphal, 
1996). Since observable socio-demographic similarity is seen as an inherent proxy of the 
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supplementary-fit when other objective information is unavailable (Werbel & Johnson, 2001; 
Cable & Edwards, 2004), we expect that external hiring of executives will be associated with a 
preference for socio-demographically similar candidates. It is important to note that we focus on 
the socio-demographic attributes of executives – and not on their experience-related characteristics 
– as the former are more likely to be associated with social-identity tendencies in executive 
selection, while the latter are more likely to be determined by job- and position-related 
requirements (see the Methodology section for a more detailed discussion). On this basis, we 
predict a negative relationship between external hiring and socio-demographic dissimilarity of new 
appointees to the incumbent group – as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: External hiring is negatively related to the demographic dissimilarity 
between a newly appointed executive and the rest of the TMT. 
 
Organizational and Environmental Contingencies 
Prior research has emphasized the role of internal and external contingencies in affecting executive 
selection decisions (Greve et al., 2015; Naveen, 2006). Studies, for example, have argued that both 
firm-level complexity and environmental uncertainty impose higher informational demands on the 
TMT (Hambrick et al., 2005), and thereby drive executive teams to appoint new TMT members 
who socio-demographically differ from the existing group (Nielsen, 2009). In this study, however, 
we argue that administrative complexity (proxied as the number of employees) and environmental 
uncertainty (proxied as industry dynamism) will have opposing moderating effects on the 
relationship between external hiring and dissimilarity of new appointees.  
Administrative complexity is primarily defined by past decisions made by the firm’s 
management, and is therefore widely perceived to be within the TMT’s scope of control. Top 
managers can increase or decrease the firm’s level of administrative complexity as they can make 
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decisions that directly impact on the size and scope of the organization (Hambrick, 2007). 
Environmental uncertainty, meanwhile, mainly depends on external circumstances, and is thus 
perceived to be a factor that is largely beyond management’s control (Dess & Beard, 1984; 
Thompson, 1967). The level of environmental uncertainty is mainly determined by macro-level 
exogenous factors, such as those emanating from economic and technological changes (Bergh & 
Lawless, 1998; Hill & Hoskisson, 1987). Thus, top managers’ ability to influence such factors is 
mostly limited. We emphasize this distinction because we contend that the difference in perceived 
controllability has a crucial impact on the decision-makers’ psychological response to external 
contingency factors in TMT appointment decisions (Das & Teng, 1999). We therefore expect that 
administrative complexity and environmental uncertainty will have different moderating effects on 
the relationship between external hiring and dissimilarity of new executives. Below, we expand on 
this logic and develop the corresponding hypotheses. 
 
Administrative Complexity 
As larger firms face more complex administrative demands in dealing with a diverse set of 
employees and internal stakeholders, large workforce size has often been conceptualized as a proxy 
of firm-level administrative complexity (Miller, 1987). There are two main reasons why we expect 
the negative relationship between external hiring and dissimilarity of new executives to become 
less pronounced under such conditions. First, as large and complex firms possess a wider pool of 
internal candidates, the perception of controllability is likely to be relatively high – even if the 
appointment of a dissimilar outsider to the TMT proves to be a wrong decision – due to the 
availability of fallback options in the large internal labor market. The perceived controllability will 
drive large complex organizations to be more open in hiring dissimilar executives from outside the 
firm, thus enhancing the information-processing and boundary-spanning capacity of the TMT. 
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Second, large workforce size implies that top managers will have to deal with greater 
decision making complexity (Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004; Damanpour, 1996; Denis, 
Denis, & Yost, 2002). To effectively respond to high information processing demands and enhance 
perceived controllability, TMTs at large firms are likely to view the appointment of socio-
demographically dissimilar executives from outside the firm as a way to increase their ability to 
manage, control, and respond to the informational demands facing the executive group. Put 
differently, the appointment of individuals who can contribute to the overall resource configuration 
of the executive group through: (a) their external knowledge, and (b) their socio-demographic 
differences to the rest of the group (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993) will be 
perceived as a vehicle to control and respond to the greater variety of demands that derive from a 
large workforce size.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The negative relationship between external hiring and demographic 
dissimilarity of newly selected executives is less pronounced under conditions of high 
administrative complexity. 
 
Environmental Uncertainty 
Environmental uncertainty refers to the extent to which an organization’s external (industry) 
environment is characterized by volatility and unpredictability (Dess & Beard, 1984). Similar to 
conditions of organizational complexity, access to diverse resources and problem-solving 
capacities at TMT level can help firms to deal with environmental uncertainty (Cannella, Park & 
Lee, 2008; Nielsen, 2009). However, environmental uncertainty has the added distinctive feature 
of being exogenously determined, and thus, not directly controllable by the firm’s management 
(Dess & Beard, 1984). Studies have shown that under conditions of low managerial controllability, 
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and high environmental uncertainty, firms are inclined to reduce the unpredictability that 
characterizes micro-level selection decisions (Johnson, 1988). From a psychological perspective, 
TMTs are likely to perceive greater uncertainty when they appoint a dissimilar executive from 
outside the firm, rather than from within the organization. As environmental uncertainty generates 
a need to reduce unpredictability in making decisions (Johnson, 1988), we expect that it will 
strengthen the predicted tendency of firms to appoint candidates who are dissimilar to incumbents 
from inside, rather than from outside the organization. 
 Indeed, this argument is in line with the behavioral decision literature, which suggests that 
firms adopt conservative approaches to decision making under uncertain environmental conditions 
(Das & Teng, 1999; Weick, 1979). In response to environmental uncertainty, management teams 
strive to mitigate unpredictability in micro-level decisions. They do so to ensure “that even if some 
unexpected outcomes [of a decision] were to materialize, they would be able to manage or control 
the situation” (Das & Teng, 1999: 768). As the decision to select a dissimilar candidate for a top 
management position implies higher micro-level unpredictability (Petersen & Saporta, 2004), 
environmental uncertainty is expected to rather strengthen the negative relationship between 
external hiring and dissimilarity of newly appointed TMT members. Thus, we derive the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The negative relationship between external hiring and demographic 
dissimilarity of newly selected executives is more pronounced under conditions of high 
environmental uncertainty. 
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Data and Methods 
Sample and Data Collection 
The initial sample consisted of all 1243 non-CEO executive appointments that occurred at 310 
listed firms headquartered in four West-European countries (i.e. Germany, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) over the period 2005 to 2009. All publicly listed firms in 
each of the four countries were ranked by market capitalization at the end of 2005 (December 31st), 
and the largest 100 firms per country were included provided that they met the following 
conditions: (1) they were not compatible with the European Union’s definition of a small and 
medium-sized enterprise at year-end 2005 (i.e. they had at least 250 employees and not less than 
€50 million annual revenues); and (2) they were not acquired by other firms or ceased to operate 
between 2005 and 2009. We focus on the period 2005 to 2009 as it provides a balanced number of 
years before and after the financial crisis – allowing us to control for potential crisis-related effects, 
and thereby enhance the generalizability of our results.  
From the initial sample of 1243 individual executive appointments, 668 observations had 
to be dropped due to data unavailability, resulting in a final sample of 575 non-CEO executive 
appointments at 170 firms. Focusing on the dissimilarity of individual executives enables us to 
examine how firms make individual-level appointment decisions – an aspect which is in line with 
the P-G fit logic. In addition, having the individual-level as our lowest level of analysis, allows us 
to observe variance decomposition effects of individual-, team/firm-, and industry-level factors in 
explaining the demographic dissimilarity of individual appointees (e.g., Nielsen, 2009). The firms 
included in our final sample were nested within 38 industries based on their primary two-digit 
standard industry classification code. As a test for differences between our sample observations 
and the initial population, we ran t-tests comparing the mean of our dependent variable (socio-
demographic dissimilarity) and our predictor variable (external hiring) between missing and non-
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missing observations. These tests showed no significant differences in the means of the two 
subsamples. 
The four Western European countries were chosen for two reasons. First, the four countries 
are preferred homes for many large corporations which attract a pool of executive candidates with 
diverse demographic profiles – offering a suitable context to assess the selection of socio-
demographically dissimilar executives. Second, these four countries have long established 
corporate reporting practices that allowed us to obtain detailed information from the public domain 
at the time of data collection. Individual executives’ demographic and background data was 
manually collected from firms’ annual reports and corporate websites. Firm- and industry-level 
data was gathered from the ThomsonONE database. Consistent with prior TMT studies with 
European samples, we defined the TMT as the highest level of corporate management by relying 
on firms’ self-reported definitions provided in annual reports (Greve et al., 2015; Nielsen & 
Nielsen, 2013).  
We follow previous studies that have separately examined non-CEO executives 
(Athanassiou & Nigh, 2002; Carpenter & Wade, 2002). As the appointment of a CEO is a 
substantively different decision than the appointment of other TMT members (Finkelstein et al., 
2009; Shen & Cannella, 2002), we exclude CEO appointments from our main analysis. Indeed, 
scholars have argued that, due to the CEO’s role as the leader of the TMT (Georgakakis, Greve & 
Ruigrok, 2017; Heyden, Reimer & van Doorn, 2017), CEO replacement and succession is 
influenced by multiple factors which are distinct from the selection of non-CEO executives 
(Cannella & Georgakakis, 2017; Harvey, Currall & Hammer, 2017, Finkelstein et al., 2009; 
Klimoski & Koles, 2001). Such factors have to do with the greater level of managerial discretion 
CEOs have in terms of making strategic decisions (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005), as well as 
selecting other senior executives (Klimoski & Koles, 2001). The appointment of a new CEO is 
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thus more likely to be determined either by the predecessor CEO (Krause, 2017) or by the board 
of directors (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Thus, focusing on non-CEO appointments enhances the 
internal consistency of our dependent variable. 
Further, scholars have argued that CEOs are likely to exert a significant influence on who 
is hired, and who is fired, in the TMT (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005). To check the CEO’s distinct 
influence in executive selection decisions, we re-ran our analysis using new appointees‘ 
dissimilarity with the CEO as an alternative dependent variable. This analysis provides similar 
results to those presented in Table 3 – with most of our hypotheses supported, albeit with a weaker 
overall model. This suggests that even in situations where CEOs have high degrees of managerial 
discretion, they will select candidates by considering their supplementary-fit to the rest of the team 
– rather than their individual-level demographic similarity with the candidate. This is in line with 
upper echelons theory, which suggests that it is not the CEO alone, but rather the entire TMT that 
influences executive selection decisions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Klimoski & Koles, 2001). In 
addition, the P-G perspective suggests that candidates are screened based on their supplementary-
fit with the entire group, not just with the leader of the team (Seong et al., 2015; Werbel & Johnson, 
2001). Following this theoretical logic, we present our results based on the dissimilarity of new 
hires to the rest of the TMT (i.e., including the CEO). 
 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is the overall degree of dissimilarity of each newly selected non-CEO 
executive relative to incumbent TMT members. The overall dissimilarity measure is a composite 
of dissimilarity in three attributes: age, gender, and nationality. These attributes have been widely 
employed in past studies as socio-demographic characteristics of executives (e.g., Heyden, Sidhu 
& Volberda, 2015), and have often been distinguished from other job-related attributes (e.g., 
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functional background) (Georgakakis et al., 2017; Bezrukova, Jehn, Zanutto & Thatcher, 2009; 
Hutzschenreuter & Horstkotte, 2013). Importantly for this study, these three attributes are socio-
demographic characteristics (Bell, Villado, Lukasik, Belau & Briggs, 2011), and have often been 
regarded as triggers of social-identity and similarity attraction inclinations at the time of executive 
selection (Nielsen, 2009; Greve et al., 2015).  
The composite dissimilarity measure consists of one continuous component (age) and two 
categorical components (gender and nationality). Age, gender, and nationality are widely employed 
in the literature as key dimensions of socio-demographic differences in TMTs (Dezsö & Ross, 
2012; Richard & Shelor, 2002; Ghemawat & Vantrappen, 2015; Ruigrok & Greve, 2008; Van Veen 
& Marsman, 2008). In this study we have not considered race, which is another important 
externally observable demographic attribute, for two reasons. First, there is no standard 
classification of race or ethnicity in Europe (Farkas, 2017) and European firms rarely report on the 
race or ethnicity of individual executives, thus making it difficult to collect accurate data. Second, 
nationality is arguably more closely associated with the underlying values and leadership behavior 
of individuals – and is thus more likely to influence executive selection decisions (Nielsen, 2009; 
Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013).  
Similar to prior studies with European samples, nationality was defined as the primary 
nationality of an executive team member (Greve et al., 2015; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013; Nielsen, 
2009). Gender was a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if a TMT member was female and 
0 otherwise. In line with prior studies (Tsui, Egan & O’Reilly, 1992), we calculated dissimilarity 
in terms of age, gender, and nationality between a newly appointed executive and incumbent TMT 
members using the distance formula expressed as: √
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑆𝑖 − 𝑆𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
2. For age Si represents the age 
(in years) of a newly appointed executive i, and Sj represents the age (in years) of each incumbent 
executive j. For categorical variables, Si represents the attribute of an individual appointee, and Sj 
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the attribute of each TMT member. To obtain a composite measure of dissimilarity for each newly 
appointed executive, we normalized age dissimilarity to take values between 0 and 1 and 
aggregated age, nationality, and gender dissimilarity into an overall measure (see also: Boone et 
al., 2004; Schaubroeck & Lam, 2002). 
We employed a composite measure of dissimilarity in observable demographic attributes 
for the following reason. According to Boone et al., “the distance of a manager from other team 
members can best be assessed by cumulating distances along several dimensions” (2004: 640). At 
the time of hiring, firms evaluate an executive candidate based on an overall compatibility 
assessment, in which they consider multiple characteristics simultaneously rather than individual 
attributes separately (Pelled, Eisenhardt & Xin, 1999). Thus, a composite measure is most suitable 
for examining the antecedents of a new appointee’s demographic dissimilarity to the rest of the 
team. 
Finally, we decided to focus on socio-demographic attributes rather than job-related 
characteristics (e.g., functional background, field of education) as they are less task related in 
nature, and thus, more influenced by similarity attraction inclinations in the context of executive 
selection. For instance, when the TMT seeks to appoint an individual to fill the Chief Financial 
Officer’s position, the team will have to search for a person with functional expertise in finance – 
regardless of whether this expertise is similar or different to the experiences of other executives. 
Given that our argumentation builds on social identity and similarity attraction theories, and as 
TMTs need to appoint executives with functional background based on the requirements of the 
executive position (rather than the candidates’ social similarity to other group members), focusing 
only on socio-demographic attributes provides a stronger correspondence between our theorizing 
and measurement of interpersonal dissimilarity in executive groups.  
 
18 
 
Independent and Moderator Variables  
We measured the hiring mode as a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if a newly appointed 
executive was hired from outside the firm and 0 otherwise. In line with other studies, we define 
externally appointed executives as those who did not possess any prior intra-firm working 
experience at the time of their initial appointment to the TMT (Shen & Cannella, 2002). 
Administrative complexity was conceptualized as firm size (number of employees) 
(Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton, 2000). Prior studies have shown that the larger the size of the 
workforce, the greater the level of complexity facing the executive group. This is owing to the 
greater variety and volume of tasks and decisions that are likely to be referred to the TMT in an 
organization with a larger number of employees (Bacon & Hoque, 2005; Guest, Michie, Conway 
& Sheehan, 2003; Thompson, 1967). Thus, we employ workforce size (number of employees) as 
a proxy of administrative complexity. Similar to prior studies, we logarithmically transformed the 
size variable to reflect diminishing effects at the upper end of the scale (Tihanyi et al., 2000). 
Environmental uncertainty was captured using Dess and Beard’s (1984) measure of 
environmental volatility. To calculate this variable, we computed the regression coefficient of time 
on the annual average sales in a firm’s primary four-digit industry during the three years prior to 
each executive appointment. Subsequently, we divided the standard error obtained from the 
regression slope coefficient of each industry by the average sales (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004).  
 
Control Variables 
The variable incumbent TMT diversity was used to control for the ex-ante heterogeneity of the 
incumbent TMT (including the CEO) prior to a new executive appointment. The initial level of 
TMT diversity is likely to vary widely across firms, and to influence the inclination toward 
appointing a dissimilar TMT member (Boone et al., 2004; Nielsen, 2009). To calculate age 
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diversity, we used the coefficient of variation by dividing the standard deviation of a team’s age in 
a given year by its mean (Backes-Gellner & Veen, 2013; Richard & Shelor, 2002). To calculate 
gender and nationality diversity, we used the widely applied Blau (1977) formula 1-Σpi2, where p 
is the proportion of team members in the demographic category i. The Blau index is widely 
regarded as an appropriate metric to capture diversity as variety in teams (Harrison & Klein, 2007). 
To develop a composite variable, we normalized age diversity and aggregated all components in a 
single measure (Boone et al., 2004). 
We also controlled for the degree of functional background diversity in the TMT using the 
Blau (1977) index. The functional background of executives was measured as the dominant 
function, i.e. the function in which the executive has spent the largest proportion of his or her career 
(Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). In line with Cannella et al. (2008), we coded the dominant function 
of each individual executive in one out of seven functional tracks: R&D and engineering; 
accounting and finance; management and administration; marketing and sales; law; personnel and 
labor relations; other (see also: Oehmichen et al., 2017; Tuggle, Schnatterly & Johnson, 2010).  
Further, we employed the firm’s degree of internationalization (DOI) as a control variable 
to account for the strategic complexity facing the organization. Including this variable allows us to 
test the effect of administrative complexity (number of employees) by taking into consideration the 
level of strategic complexity (proxied as DOI) of the firm. Similar to prior studies, the degree of 
internationalization is measured as the ratio of foreign sales to total sales in each respective 
appointment year (Collins, 1990; Tallman & Li, 1996). 
We also controlled for CEO firm tenure, by taking the number of years that the CEO has 
worked inside the firm. We used a logarithmic transformation of this variable to capture the 
diminishing effects of CEO firm tenure over time (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). Controlling for 
this variable is key, as long tenured CEOs are more inclined to select executives from inside the 
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organization (Shen & Cannella, 2002) and enjoy greater levels of discretion in making executive 
selection decisions (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Further, we controlled for the educational level of 
TMT members. Similar to prior studies (e.g., Heyden et al., 2015), advanced education was 
measured as a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if an individual executive holds a 
Master’s degree (including MBA) or a doctorate, and 0 otherwise. 
TMT size was included as a control variable to account for the notion that large TMTs may 
be inclined to replace team members more frequently (Greve et al., 2015). TMT size was coded as 
the number of TMT members in the year of appointment. This variable was logarithmically 
transformed to capture the diminishing effects of larger team size (Boeker, 1997; Tihanyi et al., 
2000). Finally, we controlled for past firm performance. Research has shown that poorly 
performing firms are more likely to alter TMT composition (Greve et al., 2015; Pennings & Wezel, 
2010; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Thus, we controlled for the three-year average return on assets 
prior to each executive appointment. 
 
Analytical Strategy 
As our data is based on three different levels of analysis (i.e. individual, firm, and industry), we 
employed a three-level hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) technique (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
At the first level of analysis, the study investigates differences between individual appointees 
nested within firms/teams. At the second level, the study considers differences between firms/teams 
nested in industries, whereas differences between industries are observed at the third level of 
analysis. Centering decisions are important in multilevel models. In analysis that includes cross-
level interactions, centering to the grand mean is usually the preferred option (Bliese, 2000). Since 
our models and hypotheses include cross-level interactions, we centered variables to the grand 
mean (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
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 To account for potential endogeneity and sample-selection issues, we employed a Heckman 
two stage approach (Karaevli & Zajac, 2013; Quigley & Hambrick, 2012; Weng & Lin, 2014). The 
most crucial issue for the effective operationalization of Heckman’s (1979) model is to identify 
suitable instrumental variables that are significantly correlated with the independent variable (i.e. 
external hiring) and not significantly correlated with the dependent variable (i.e. new appointees’ 
dissimilarity in our case) (Semadeni, Withers & Certo, 2014). In line with recent executive 
selection literature (Karaevli & Zajac, 2013), we employed the rate of external hiring in the 
industry as an instrument in our study. Correlation results indicate that the chosen instrumental 
variable is suitable for our study, as it is highly correlated with external hiring (r= 0.23, p<0.001), 
and not significantly correlated with the dependent variable in the final sample of 575 executive 
appointments (r = -0.06, p>0.10).  
At the Heckman first stage, we conducted a Probit regression analysis to predict the 
likelihood of appointing a new executive from the external labor market. This included the full 
sample of firms that experienced TMT transition and firms that did not. Results of the Probit first 
stage analysis are presented in the Appendix. The inverse Mill’s ratio predicted in the first stage 
model was then included as a control in the main analysis (see Table 3) – allowing us to account 
for potential endogeneity and sample selection issues. 
 
Results 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics and correlations. Table 2 presents results of the null HLM 
model. Variance decomposition allowed us to consider the extent to which the variance in the 
dependent variable is explained by each level of analysis (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Results 
show that the individual-level and the firm-level explained the highest proportion of variance in 
the dependent variable with 47 percent and 42 percent respectively. This means that the 
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dissimilarity of newly appointed executives is mainly explained by the attributes of the individual 
executive, as well as by firm-level factors. The third level represented a smaller proportion of 
variance with 11 percent, which means that the industry level does matter, albeit to a lesser extent. 
The results of the null model (see Table 2) are statistically significant at p<0.001. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 presents results of the main analysis. Model 1 displays results with control variables 
only, while Models 2 to 5 present results including the main predictor and interactions. In support 
of Hypothesis 1, Model 2 shows a negative relationship between external hiring and dissimilarity 
of newly appointed executives (p<0.01). Further, in support of Hypothesis 2, Model 3 shows that 
the negative relationship between external hiring and new appointees’ dissimilarity becomes less 
pronounced at firms facing high administrative complexity (p<0.05). As Figure 1 illustrates, high 
levels of administrative complexity weaken the negative relationship between external hiring and 
dissimilarity of new executives. It is worth noting, however, that this relationship receives only 
partial support in the full model (Model 5 in Table 3) with p<0.10. This suggests that we should be 
somewhat cautious in our interpretations of this finding. Further, in support of Hypothesis 3, Model 
4 shows that the negative association between external hiring and dissimilarity of newly appointed 
executives is more pronounced under conditions of high environmental uncertainty (p<0.05). 
Figure 2 depicts this relationship, demonstrating its strengthening effect under conditions of high 
environmental uncertainty. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
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--------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Supplementary Analysis1 
Recent studies highlight the need to examine demographic characteristics separately in order to 
understand the impact of TMT diversity on organizations (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2004; Nielsen & 
Nielsen, 2013). To assess the impact of using a multi-dimensional dissimilarity construct as 
opposed to single-dimension constructs as dependent variables, we decomposed our multi-
dimensional dissimilarity construct and ran separate HLM analyses for each of the three 
demographic dissimilarity components (i.e. employing gender dissimilarity, nationality 
dissimilarity, and age dissimilarity as dependent variables separately). Results show that external 
hiring has a negative and marginally significant effect (p<0.10) on age dissimilarity and a negative 
and significant effect on nationality dissimilarity (p<0.05). At the same time, external hiring did 
not exhibit a significant effect on gender dissimilarity (p>0.10). However, following the theoretical 
argument that firms simultaneously consider all demographic attributes to assess the fit of a 
candidate to the group (Boone et al., 2004) we only present results with the overall dissimilarity as 
dependent variable.  
 In addition, we tested the robustness of our results by adjusting our dependent variable to 
the year average. This enabled us to consider whether the observed effects are influenced by the 
financial crisis which occurred in the year 2007 – which is in the middle of the observed period. 
                                                          
1 Results of the supplementary analyses are available upon request from the authors. 
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Results of this supplementary analysis with the dependent variable adjusted at the year average are 
similar to those presented in this study – confirming the robustness of our results. 
 
Discussion 
Our study offers several contributions to extant strategic human resource management, upper 
echelons, and TMT diversity research. First, while some studies have found that TMTs are inclined 
to reproduce homogeneity over time by hiring executives who demographically resemble 
incumbents (Boone et al., 2004), research evidence shows that environmental and organizational 
factors encourage firms to select demographically dissimilar executives (Greve et al., 2015; 
Nielsen, 2009). Our study adds a new element to this discussion. It shows that dissimilar top 
managers are more likely to be promoted from inside the firm, while external hiring often results 
in homosocial reproduction. It also demonstrates that this relationship significantly varies with the 
multilevel contingencies surrounding the organization at the time of executive selection. From a 
theoretical viewpoint, our findings suggest that even when dominant groups overcome their 
tendency toward reproducing homogeneity, they do so by appointing executives who have already 
worked with the organization – and have thus been assimilated to the processes, culture, and 
internal aspects of the firm. To this end, our study constitutes a step toward answering the question 
of “why do TMTs look the way they do” (Hambrick, 2007: 338), by highlighting the importance 
of the hiring origin of newly appointed executives. 
 The observed negative relationship between external hiring and dissimilarity of new 
executives has important implications for the P-G fit literature. Prior research in this area poses 
interpersonal similarity as a vehicle for ensuring a supplementary fit between a new appointee and 
other group members. Our results, however, suggest that this assumption is more likely to hold true 
for external hires. It may be that firms often possess less information about the external candidates’ 
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supplementary-fit with the organization and the existing top management group, and thereby place 
more emphasis on their externally observable demographic traits when making selection decisions. 
At the same time, for internal candidates, demographic similarity is likely to play a less important 
role at the time of the executive selection process. Firms can assess the internal candidate’s 
supplementary-fit to the group by considering directly his or her prior record and socialization 
inside the organization – rather than his or her similarity with incumbent group members in 
externally-observable socio-demographic attributes. In this regard, our study underscores the 
importance of hiring modes as key boundary conditions on how firms attempt to realize a 
supplementary-fit between newly selected individuals and the incumbent group. 
Further, our results show that a firm’s internal and external environment plays an important 
role in determining the attributes of newly appointed team members. Past studies have adopted a 
rational choice approach to argue that both organizational complexity and environmental 
uncertainty impose greater information processing demands on the TMT, and thus, they drive firms 
to select executive leaders with diverse backgrounds and characteristics (e.g. Nielsen, 2009). Our 
findings challenge this view by showing that these two contextual conditions have opposing effects 
on the relationship between external hiring and dissimilarity of new members. While organizational 
complexity increases the likelihood that firms appoint dissimilar top managers from the external 
labor market, environmental uncertainty is rather likely to strengthen the tendency of hiring 
dissimilar executives from inside the firm.  
Indeed, the opposite moderating effects of administrative complexity and environmental 
uncertainty can be attributed to the subtle differences between these two constructs. High 
administrative complexity deriving from a large internal workforce is likely to provide top 
managers with the necessary confidence and experience to respond effectively to high information-
processing demands. Such firms will therefore add the required variety of perspectives at the top 
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of the firm, without the internal or external origin of candidates being a major consideration in the 
hiring process. In the case of an unsuccessful external appointment, decision makers in such firms 
will also have the fallback option of reverting to a large pool of internal candidates for a relatively 
quick replacement. Environmental uncertainty, on the other hand, is likely to elicit a different 
psychological response emphasizing incremental changes to preceding structures and paradigms 
(Das & Teng, 1999; Weick, 1979). As an external factor that is beyond managerial controllability, 
high environmental uncertainty reinforces the need to attain a supplementary fit between external 
candidates and incumbent team members through incremental steps rather than radical changes – 
i.e., either through the selection of outsiders who resemble incumbent members, or through 
internally promoted dissimilar executives. 
Viewed in tandem, our findings show that similarity attraction inclinations in TMTs may 
ceteris paribus be fundamentally difficult to overcome. Our findings suggest that diversity in TMTs 
may primarily be developed by appointing dissimilar internal candidates who have already been 
socialized, assimilated, and groomed inside the organization. Externally appointed executives, on 
the other hand, are more likely to resemble the incumbent executives in externally observable social 
attributes. Individuals who have common firm specific backgrounds and shared intra-firm 
socialization are more likely to assimilate into the dominant groups and develop similar mental 
models and ways of thinking (Schneider, 1987). This may potentially supersede their underlying 
individual-level demographic differences, and thereby suppress the advantageous aspects that 
diversity and dissimilarity can offer to the group at the time of decision making (Shore, Randel, 
Chung, Dean, Ehrhart & Singh, 2011). On the other hand, however, ‘internally sourced diversity’ 
may enable firms to make efficient use of variety in executive characteristics and backgrounds, as 
shared organizational experiences create a common platform upon which diverse viewpoints, 
knowledge, and resources can be leveraged (Georgakakis & Ruigrok, 2017; Grossman, 2007).  
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Broadly speaking, the outcomes of this study are important to enhance our understanding 
of diversity effects in strategic leadership. Viewed through the lens of a multilevel upper echelons 
framework (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005), our work suggests that the appointment of dissimilar 
executives is an intermediate phenomenon that is simultaneously guided by micro-level executive 
hiring preferences and is influenced by meso- and macro-level boundary conditions. The negative 
relationship between external hiring and demographic dissimilarity of new executives suggests that 
TMT diversity evolves at the intersection between behavioral and rational logics that 
interdependently affect executive selection mechanisms. Future research can expand our model, 
and examine whether externally appointed executives are more likely to contribute to the overall 
knowledge-base and performance of the team when they socio-demographically resemble the 
existing group. This should be done by considering the multilevel factors surrounding the 
organization at the time of executive selection. 
Further, our findings contribute to research on homosocial reproduction. They show that, 
in their effort to evaluate a supplementary-fit between the individual candidate and the rest of the 
group, firms are more likely to hire outsiders who socio-demographically resemble the rest of the 
executive team. This implies that the arguments of similarity attraction that lead groups toward 
homosocial reproduction (Schneider, 1987) have greater explanatory power when the firm appoints 
candidates from the external labor market, rather than internally. Future studies can expand our 
research model to investigate whether the appointment of outsiders who resemble the rest of the 
executive team reduces the likelihood of early departure or dismissal after their appointment 
(Zhang, 2008; Zhang & Qu, 2016). In addition, studies can examine whether the appointment of 
dissimilar outsiders are likely to impact group-level dynamics, such as behavioral disintegration 
(Li & Hambrick, 2005), or decision diversion in executive groups (Cannella & Georgakakis, 2017; 
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Harvey et al., 2017). This will help to understand the role of hiring modes in determining the 
selection and retention of externally hired executives.  
 
Implications for Practice, Limitations and Future Research 
Apart from its theoretical relevance, our paper has important practical implications. Research has 
argued that, since externally appointed executives are hired to act as problem-solving and 
information processing agents, they are expected to be dissimilar to incumbent executives in other 
demographic characteristics and backgrounds (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). This is because 
dissimilar-outsiders are likely to add different perspectives at the time of strategic decision making, 
enhancing the overall problem-solving and information processing capacity of the team (Jackson 
et al., 2003). However, our study challenges this point of view by showing that when firms appoint 
executives from outside the organizations, they tend to select candidates who are demographically 
similar to the incumbent team. Future research should test whether TMT diversity generated 
through external hiring is likely to overstretch the adaptive capacity of the candidate or the 
integrative capacity of the incumbent top management group (Grossman, 2007; Jackson, et al., 
1993). A related avenue for future research would be to test whether external knowledge can more 
easily be transferred, and absorbed, when externally hired executives share common characteristics 
and backgrounds with incumbent TMT members (see e.g., Georgakakis & Ruigrok, 2017; 
Grossman, 2007). 
Our study is subject to some limitations that offer promising research avenues. First, we 
lack detailed data on the exact executive candidate pools to assess the relative success of dissimilar 
candidates in internal and external hiring processes. While our findings suggest that individuals 
with minority demographic characteristics are more likely to follow an internal path to the top, 
future survey-based or qualitative research is needed to advance our understanding of the career 
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trajectories that are most beneficial for demographic minorities in overcoming imperfections in 
internal and external managerial labor markets. Second, the paper does not address the subsequent 
performance implications of hiring dissimilar executives from within and from outside the firm. A 
valuable extension of this study would be to examine whether dissimilar executives hired through 
internal promotion (as opposed to external appointments) are more – or less – likely to contribute 
positively to subsequent team and firm performance. Further exploration of the effects of internally 
versus externally sourced dissimilarity would help to improve our understanding of how individual 
executives are likely to contribute to the performance of the TMT and the organization.  
Third, our study does not consider the power differentials that exist among team members. 
As suggested by Roberto (2003), the inner circle (i.e., stable core) of the most powerful strategic 
leader (i.e., the CEO) may have a more influential role in affecting strategic decisions compared to 
the dynamic periphery (i.e., the less powerful TMT members). Indeed, some top managers may 
play a more important role than others in determining who is hired, and who is fired, in the TMT 
(Cannella & Holcomb, 2005). In our study, we define the TMT based on the self-reported 
definitions provided in the firm’s annual reports and corporate websites. While this archival data 
approach enables us to draw on a large sample and observe generalizable patterns, it comes with 
data limitations in terms of measuring interactions and power differentials among team members. 
Future research could use qualitative approaches, such as multiple case studies, to examine the 
impact of intra-TMT power differentials, and power struggles, in executive selection decisions.  
Fourth, our study focuses only on three socio-demographic attributes to investigate the 
effects of similarity attraction and homogeneity reproduction in teams and working groups (i.e., 
age, gender and nationality). We focus on these attributes rather than job-related characteristics 
(e.g., functional background or field of education) as non task-related attributes are more likely to 
be influenced by similarity attraction inclinations in the context of executive teams. However, 
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future studies can examine how external versus internal hiring modes affect the selection of 
dissimilar executives in terms of career background and experience – such as functional experience, 
international experience, field of education, or experience in turnaround situations. This would be 
in line with studies suggesting that there is no absolute distinction between relational and task-
related diversity attributes (Ou, Seo, Choi & Hom, 2016; Van Knippenberg, de Dreu & Homan, 
2004) and thus help to further elaborate our understanding of executive selection mechanisms in 
organizations’ upper echelons. In addition, while our study considers nationality rather than race 
dissimilarity as (a) data on race is difficult to obtain in the context of European TMTs and (b) 
nationality is more closely related to the cultural values of individuals, future studies can examine 
the impact of race dissimilarity in executive selection decisions.  Finally, our sample consists of 
large stock-listed firms in four Western European economies. Thus, our results are not necessarily 
generalizable to smaller non-listed firms, or to firms headquartered in other countries. Future 
research could thus assess the generalizability of our findings in different cultural and institutional 
contexts. 
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Table 1. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.Demographic 
dissimilarity 
1.04 0.43 ~         
  
2.External 
appointment (yes=1) 
0.38 0.49 -0.08* ~        
  
3.Advanced education 0.75 0.43 -0.01 -0.01 ~         
4. CEO  
firm tenure (log) 
2.19 0.99 0.02 -0.20* 0.04 ~      
  
5.Admin.complexity 
(employees log) 
10.00 1.62 0.12* -0.20* -0.03 0.30* ~     
  
6. DOI 0.64 0.31 0.24* -0.11* 0.10* 0.13* 0.25* ~       
7.IncumbentTMT 
social diversity 
0.71 0.32 0.47* 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.29* ~    
  
8.Incumbent TMT 
functional diversity 
0.60 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.11* -0.05 0.15* 0.15* ~   
  
9. log Team size 1.93 0.36 0.28* -0.08* -0.05 0.03 0.27* 0.23* 0.31* 0.37* ~    
10. Past performance 0.04 0.05 0.13* -0.01 -0.01 0.13* -0.14* 0.20* 0.10* 0.18* 0.01 ~   
11.Environmental 
uncertainty 
0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.10* -0.15* -0.03 -0.08 0.08* 0.04    0.04 ~ 
N= 575; * p< 0.05   
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Table 2. Variance Decomposition 
 
Null model 
Variance decomposition 
(percentage) 
Level 1 (individual) 0.47 
Level 2 (firm) 0.42 
Level 3 (industry) 0.11 
Deviance: -2*e(ll) 496.23 
Significance p <0.001 
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Table 3. HLM Analysis Predicting Dissimilarity of New Executives a, b 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 coef. coef. coef. coef. coef. 
Intercept 
1.11*** 
(0.18) 
1.15*** 
(0.18) 
1.18*** 
(0.18) 
1.16*** 
(0.18) 
1.18*** 
(0.18) 
Inverse Mill’s  
ratio 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
Year dummies included included Included Included included 
Country dummies included included Included Included included 
Level 3      
Environmental 
uncertainty 
0.58 
(0.82) 
0.50 
(0.82) 
0.41 
(0.81) 
1.81† 
(0.97) 
1.55 
(0.97) 
Level 2      
Team size (log)  
0.21** 
(0.07) 
0.19** 
(0.07) 
0.21** 
(0.07) 
0.19** 
(0.07) 
0.21** 
(0.07) 
Incumbent TMT 
social diversity 
0.33*** 
(0.06) 
0.34*** 
(0.06) 
0.33*** 
(0.06) 
0.34*** 
(0.06) 
0.33*** 
(0.06) 
Incumbent TMT  
functional diversity 
-0.23* 
(0.11) 
-0.20† 
(0.11) 
-0.21† 
(0.11) 
-0.19† 
(0.11) 
-0.20† 
(0.11) 
Past performance  
 
0.95** 
(0.36) 
0.95** 
(0.35) 
1.03** 
(0.35) 
0.97** 
(0.35) 
1.03** 
(0.35) 
Administrative 
complexity 
(employees log)  
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
DOI 
0.11 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
CEO  
firm tenure (log) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Level 1      
Advanced  
education 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
External 
appointment 
 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
Cross-level 
interactions 
     
Adm.. complexity X 
External 
appointment 
  
0.04* 
(0.02) 
 
0.04† 
(0.02) 
Env. uncertainty X 
External 
appointment 
   
-3.60* 
(1.47) 
-3.11* 
(1.48) 
Deviance: -2*e(ll) 395.47*** 388.37*** 383.10*** 382.40*** 378.72*** 
aIndividual level: N= 575, firm/team level: N=170, industry level: N=38 
b Standard errors are indicated in parentheses 
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
 
 
42 
 
 
Figure 1. Effects of the interaction between external hiring and organizational complexity 
 
   
 
Figure 2. Effects of the interaction between external hiring and environmental uncertainty 
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Appendix 
 
Step 1: Probit Model of External Hiring   
 Coef. Std.Err 
Intercept -1.73*** (0.14) 
Team size  0.01 (0.01) 
Past performance  -0.70† (0.41) 
Firm size (employees) -0.00** (0.00) 
DOI -0.00 (0.08) 
CEO tenure  -0.04*** (0.01) 
Environmental uncertainty 0.43 (1.57) 
Year 2005 -0.05 (0.09) 
Year 2006 0.04 (0.09) 
Year 2007 omitted omitted 
Year 2008 0.02 (0.09) 
Year 2009 0.05 (0.09) 
CHE -0.07 (0.10) 
DEU  -0.08 (0.10) 
NLD  omitted omitted 
GBR  -0.01 (0.11) 
Industry external hiring rate 6.55*** (0.85) 
Chi2 114.24*** 
N= 5365 
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
